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bodeadly 17 minutes ago [-]
A central point of this article seems to be claiming that adding a device in AD is an administrative bottleneck compared to cloud.
If that is the claim, it is false.
By default Authenticated Users have an "Add workstations to domain" capability (AKA ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota attribute on their account) that allows a regular user to create up to 10 machine accounts with zero admin intervention.
Machine accounts have limited rights compared to regular users.
AD provides fine grained distributed policy and cert managment.
After decades of emperical refinement, AD is often superior to what the cloud offers including Entra.
In environments with many PCs that require centrally managed policy, AD is still relavant and probably required.
I think it is also true that there are and always will be many companies that simply cannot expose these PCs to the cloud either because they're working with data that cannot be in the cloud like legal files, finanical documents, schematics or they cannot risk being tethered to the Internet.
You know that little micro PC attached to the cart in every exam room in a doctors office?
There is a 99% chance it is joined to AD.
OptionOfT 60 minutes ago [-]
I remember in the past where we had users in AD, we'd sign in via ASP.NET, where we had to do something to allow that ASP.NET session to be elevated to one valid in Active Directory.
That session was then used to connect to Microsoft SQL Server where access to data was set at a company level.
It all flowed beautifully.
I remember having an issue with A user delegating to Service A which then delegated to Service B. That second hop is kinda special. Service A must be allowed to re-delegate.
(I quickly googled it) The solution was Constrained Delegation with Protocol Transition...
This brings back memories.
gopalv 11 minutes ago [-]
> Constrained Delegation
This was pretty much Kerberos, but the embrace-extend Microsoft version was better than the regular krb5.
AD was the only consistent implementation across deployments, because it was nearly identical across customers.
Every linux implementation would be a unique snowflake you needed to know exactly how it worked each time, while the Microsoft version had quirks but it was the same issues in every customer (RBCD).
breakwaterlabs 29 minutes ago [-]
> Human approval doesn’t scale to developers creating and deprecating testing databases, Kubernetes clusters, and CI runners at will.
Service (or gMSA) accounts handle this, and auth-integrated reverse proxies can move parts of the problem into a more tractable place.
I feel like the article also conveniently forgets that kerberos/ldap backends for SSO systems are extremely common, and solve this.
> In Kubernetes, each pod gets a service account token, which allows it to assert its identity within the cluster.
How is this qualitatively different than onboarding a new computer object or gMSA entitlement in AD?
The problems that the blog asserts affect AD (how to onboard and delegate access and trust) are inherent in any sufficiently robust identity implementation.
And you can use gMSA for IIS application pools as well. Completely passwordless.
prussian 2 hours ago [-]
I still don't understand the purpose of gMSA. It almost seems like an admission that password rotation policies are nonsense, so you hide the password rotation deep in Windows, or in the case of your link, a credential-fetcher.
What exactly are we doing here? Am I the only one who thinks this is nuts?
PhageGenerator 1 hours ago [-]
The best password is the one you don't know.
Too many times I have had services break because a service account password expired or was changed without updating the relevant services becuase the service account was reused and not documented.
gMSA accounts solve these problems becuase the password is managed automatically, no need to manually update a service after you set it to run under a gMSA.
This also prevents service account misuse, only specific servers are allowed to access the password.
breakwaterlabs 23 minutes ago [-]
gMSAs solve several problems.
Password rotation is an issue because the necessity of using a credential incentivizes its insecure storage and low entropy so that ops teams can onboard new services. This in turn necessitates rotation to limit the danger of exposure or kerberoasting (bruteforcing the TGS).
gMSAs ensure that credentials
- Are frequently rotated with no coordination or admin involvement
- Are of sufficient entropy to be non-bruteforceable
- are infeasible to store insecurely
They also robustly solve the question of tracking use: the gMSA states where it may be used and what principals may retrieve the credential, secured with a machine password (which, itself, carries the above security properties).
skinfaxi 2 hours ago [-]
> As an example, GitHub automation requires personal access tokens or GitHub private keys and doesn’t work with any directory identity.
Can't you create an Entra app/service principal and use OIDC to avoid personal identities?
jonsagara 1 hours ago [-]
Yes. I just did this yesterday with a user-assigned managed identity so that GitHub Actions could deploy an Azure Function.
ljm 24 minutes ago [-]
If you're not using OIDC when using CI to take actions in your infra then you're probably doing something wrong.
edg5000 15 minutes ago [-]
Offtopic: The font on this website has some rendering issues.
tarballing 1 hours ago [-]
This is an advertisement
breakwaterlabs 22 minutes ago [-]
Those who fail to fully understand kerberos/LDAP are doomed to (badly) reimplement it as a paid SaaS offering?
1 hours ago [-]
JP44 2 hours ago [-]
Unrelated but Infisical recently moved existing rbac features from their selfhosted version behind a paywall [1]. The discussion has had no response from the team in the past 2 days [2]
sadly, openbao is still the only full-featured and fully-opensource serious contender in this space ("sadly", because I find it a bit clunky to use and configure)
8cvor6j844qw_d6 46 minutes ago [-]
Noped out after the per machine id fees, no chance of being evaluated at all.
gardnr 54 minutes ago [-]
OpenBao Is a thing. Is there a fork of Infisical yet?
jarym 56 minutes ago [-]
But it's open source and people have Claude so they can code an alternative or maybe just take the pre-paywalled version and add the security updates? Isn't that the point of it being OSS.
I read the reddit post:
> infisical got big off this community. this sub recommending it as the open source vault alternative, people filing bugs, sending PRs, answering questions, giving it stars. and this is how they pay that back.
It's sad it has to be said but bugs, PRs and stars don't pay the bills for the people building and maintaining software. Totally disingenuous of them to gate something in a patch release, no excuse for that at all.
waz0wski 1 hours ago [-]
Shouldn't be surprising
It's what most VC backed faux open-source software companies have done for the past decade+ in order to lure in ~~victims~~ customers
canucker2016 25 minutes ago [-]
tl;dr - AD history - AD started as the directory for Exchange email server. NT picked up the project and added necessary bits to make it work for a company intranet.
> Human approval doesn’t scale to developers creating and deprecating testing
> databases, Kubernetes clusters, and CI runners at will. Contemporary AD
> implementations deal with this by deferring authority. An admin token (sometimes
> hardcoded…) automatically joins new identities. [...]
> Even if you built all of the complex automations to reflect every testing database
> and Kubernetes pod in AD with automated admin approval, it’s security theater. The
> unified directory would exist on paper, but lack authority. [...]
> Modern cloud infrastructure automatically asserts machine identity: [...] In
> Azure, you can configure a machine identity in Entra ID and let Azure’s Instance
> Metadata Service (IMDS) automatically issue OAuth tokens when machines request
> them.
Okay, so configuring machine identities manually in AD doesn't "scale" to the container age, fine. But configuring machine identities in EntraID does? How is auto-issueing identities in AD "security theater", but auto-issueing identities in EntraID the way to go?
logophobia 1 hours ago [-]
Well, typically you'd use bicep or terraform for managing entra id. Manually configuring auth and identities is indeed a nightmare.
breakwaterlabs 20 minutes ago [-]
You don't have to restrict AD join to admins only.
There are reasons to do so, but if the claim is that velocity is more important than vetting the entity you are establishing a trust relationship with, it is an option.
philipwhiuk 2 hours ago [-]
Yeah this blogspam didn't even explain how they solve the problem - it's just "use our thing".
Instead, we have 20 passwords for 25 different internal dev tools. We have to pay $2.99/month to some "MDM" that barely has control of the machine.
AD was good in theory, but the weight of crap implementation that had to be preserved for backwards compatibility was awful. It was like IE6 unfortunately.
Kerberos is a really good concept. That should be what we're doing instead of paying $2.99/month*mac for management.
kazen44 23 minutes ago [-]
active directory itself is one of the best pieces of software microsoft has ever made in my opinion.
It rarely breaks, and the featureset it provides is very nice and quite easily expandable.
its a shame integrating it with exchange makes the upgrades a nightmare, because of schema additions from exchange which get put into AD.
seniorThrowaway 31 minutes ago [-]
I'm sure active directory is truly dead, this PR blog wouldn't lie.
chung8123 41 minutes ago [-]
What is the open source alternative to Entra (AD)?
pak9rabid 16 minutes ago [-]
Samba 4?
ok123456 34 minutes ago [-]
ldap
adolph 35 minutes ago [-]
The recent DevOps Paradox podcast covered similar ground in this week's episode "Secrets Management for AI Agents." The interviewee argues that "an AI agent is a workload and should be identified the way workloads already are, using SPIFFE and its runtime, SPIRE."
AD = LDAP, Kerberos, DNS and user/group/host policy. That is not really ever going away. Particularly for on-prem large institutions with lots of machines. In BYOD environments sure but I don't think that has supplanted your traditional company issued Lenovo/HP/Dell in the majority of institutions.
zokier 54 minutes ago [-]
sure, it is never really going away, the same way ibm mainframes and cobol never fully went away. but the era where practically every company had their own ad server running somewhere is pretty much over. even ms houses are more likely to use entra stuff or something instead of classic ad.
anthk 35 minutes ago [-]
When you can spawn local, remote or virtualized Unix machines for free everywhere AD it's obsolete. Add web clients on top and suddenly the whole NT+AD infra it's as usable as any DOS PC in 2002 for any company.
You are not tied to an user+domain anymore.
johannes1234321 1 hours ago [-]
a lot of work moved away from those decices and to mobile phones and tablets.
But even on the bigger machines (avoiding the word desktoo) the world changed: Laptios are a lot nore common. There login to domain controler and fetching home directory, mijnting network shares for shared data, etc doesn't work anymore either as machines aren't on the company nerwork, even if provided by the company and under device manafment.
All that data management moved to O365 and other "cloud" syncing.
But all those things still require LDAP-like things and policies which can be managed in AD or similar.
bigbuppo 1 hours ago [-]
Are you okay? You're typing like you're having a stroke.
srean 12 minutes ago [-]
Probably too small a keyboard.
br0ceph 2 hours ago [-]
AD is the worst, its the MS moat, to lock all into their vendor garbage.
I tell ppl all the time, AD is an infection, and wherever u see it, it must be eliminated.
Microsoft has never built any secure software ever or had its customers in mind, so putting AD at the center of ur organization and allowing it to fester, is not doing the needful
Avoid microsoft at all costs, or ur just clownstriking urself
Machine accounts have limited rights compared to regular users. AD provides fine grained distributed policy and cert managment. After decades of emperical refinement, AD is often superior to what the cloud offers including Entra. In environments with many PCs that require centrally managed policy, AD is still relavant and probably required.
I think it is also true that there are and always will be many companies that simply cannot expose these PCs to the cloud either because they're working with data that cannot be in the cloud like legal files, finanical documents, schematics or they cannot risk being tethered to the Internet. You know that little micro PC attached to the cart in every exam room in a doctors office? There is a 99% chance it is joined to AD.
That session was then used to connect to Microsoft SQL Server where access to data was set at a company level.
It all flowed beautifully.
I remember having an issue with A user delegating to Service A which then delegated to Service B. That second hop is kinda special. Service A must be allowed to re-delegate.
(I quickly googled it) The solution was Constrained Delegation with Protocol Transition...
This brings back memories.
This was pretty much Kerberos, but the embrace-extend Microsoft version was better than the regular krb5.
AD was the only consistent implementation across deployments, because it was nearly identical across customers.
Every linux implementation would be a unique snowflake you needed to know exactly how it worked each time, while the Microsoft version had quirks but it was the same issues in every customer (RBCD).
Service (or gMSA) accounts handle this, and auth-integrated reverse proxies can move parts of the problem into a more tractable place.
I feel like the article also conveniently forgets that kerberos/ldap backends for SSO systems are extremely common, and solve this.
> In Kubernetes, each pod gets a service account token, which allows it to assert its identity within the cluster.
How is this qualitatively different than onboarding a new computer object or gMSA entitlement in AD?
The problems that the blog asserts affect AD (how to onboard and delegate access and trust) are inherent in any sufficiently robust identity implementation.
Too many times I have had services break because a service account password expired or was changed without updating the relevant services becuase the service account was reused and not documented.
gMSA accounts solve these problems becuase the password is managed automatically, no need to manually update a service after you set it to run under a gMSA.
This also prevents service account misuse, only specific servers are allowed to access the password.
Password rotation is an issue because the necessity of using a credential incentivizes its insecure storage and low entropy so that ops teams can onboard new services. This in turn necessitates rotation to limit the danger of exposure or kerberoasting (bruteforcing the TGS).
gMSAs ensure that credentials
- Are frequently rotated with no coordination or admin involvement
- Are of sufficient entropy to be non-bruteforceable
- are infeasible to store insecurely
They also robustly solve the question of tracking use: the gMSA states where it may be used and what principals may retrieve the credential, secured with a machine password (which, itself, carries the above security properties).
Can't you create an Entra app/service principal and use OIDC to avoid personal identities?
[1] https://www.reddit.com/r/homelab/s/teM83aKLMa [2] https://github.com/Infisical/infisical/discussions/9499
I read the reddit post:
> infisical got big off this community. this sub recommending it as the open source vault alternative, people filing bugs, sending PRs, answering questions, giving it stars. and this is how they pay that back.
It's sad it has to be said but bugs, PRs and stars don't pay the bills for the people building and maintaining software. Totally disingenuous of them to gate something in a patch release, no excuse for that at all.
It's what most VC backed faux open-source software companies have done for the past decade+ in order to lure in ~~victims~~ customers
The manager/creator of AD, Don Hacherl, relayed the early history of AD in a comment correcting Steve Sinofsky's incorrect high-level view of directory services evolution in WinNT - see https://hardcoresoftware.learningbyshipping.com/p/021-expand...
The following article further fleshed out the conflicting priorities of the various groups at MS concerning directory services. see https://hardcoresoftware.learningbyshipping.com/p/bonus-the-...
There are reasons to do so, but if the claim is that velocity is more important than vetting the entity you are establishing a trust relationship with, it is an option.
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/managed-ide...
Instead, we have 20 passwords for 25 different internal dev tools. We have to pay $2.99/month to some "MDM" that barely has control of the machine.
AD was good in theory, but the weight of crap implementation that had to be preserved for backwards compatibility was awful. It was like IE6 unfortunately.
Kerberos is a really good concept. That should be what we're doing instead of paying $2.99/month*mac for management.
It rarely breaks, and the featureset it provides is very nice and quite easily expandable.
its a shame integrating it with exchange makes the upgrades a nightmare, because of schema additions from exchange which get put into AD.
https://www.devopsparadox.com/episodes/secrets-management-fo...
You are not tied to an user+domain anymore.
But even on the bigger machines (avoiding the word desktoo) the world changed: Laptios are a lot nore common. There login to domain controler and fetching home directory, mijnting network shares for shared data, etc doesn't work anymore either as machines aren't on the company nerwork, even if provided by the company and under device manafment.
All that data management moved to O365 and other "cloud" syncing.
But all those things still require LDAP-like things and policies which can be managed in AD or similar.
I tell ppl all the time, AD is an infection, and wherever u see it, it must be eliminated.
Microsoft has never built any secure software ever or had its customers in mind, so putting AD at the center of ur organization and allowing it to fester, is not doing the needful
Avoid microsoft at all costs, or ur just clownstriking urself
You're the clown. Learn how to write.